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Exposure: Theory and Evidence About All the Ways It Matters
Abstract
Much work on the public health communication component of social marketing focuses on message
development. But there is good evidence that failure and success in public health communication is
better predicted by variation in exposure to messages achieved than it is by variation in quality of
messages. The inconsistent results about effects from some major projects (Stanford Heart Disease,
Minnesota Heart Health, Pawtucket Heart Health, COMMIT) may reflect their lack of success in obtaining
heavy exposure to their messages. Those results contrast with the successful results of a variety of other
programs, particularly kitchen sink programs, which have been able to obtain higher levels of exposure
and have some evidence of important effects.
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EXPOSURE: THEORY AND
EVIDENCE ABOUT ALL THE WAYS
IT MATTERS
By Robert C. Hornik

INTRODUCTION
Much work on the public health communication component of social marketing focuses on message development. But there is good evidence that failure and success in
public health communication is better predicted by variation in exposure to messages achieved than it is by variation in quality of messages. The inconsistent results about
effects from some major projects (Stanford Heart Disease,
Minnesota Heart Health, Pawtucket Heart Health, COMMIT)
may reflect their lack of success in obtaining heavy exposure to their messages. Those results contrast with the
successful results of a variety of other programs, particularly kitchen sink programs, which have been able to obtain
higher levels of exposure and have some evidence of
important effects.
Two follow-on fundamental questions are raised by
these results: How is it that high exposure can be achieved,
particularly in the absence of money to purchase media
time? How is it that exposure produces effects? Heavy
exposure may matter for effects for a variety of reasons:
increased opportunity for learning specific messages;
increases in perception that an issue is important to take
into account; increases in the likelihood that social discussion of messages will be stimulated; and increases in the
perception that a new behavior is socially expected.

SOME PROBLEMATIC RESULTS
The results of three projects illustrate some apparent
program failures. The Community Intervention Trial for
Smoking Cessation (COMMIT) project was a very large
experiment mounted by the National Cancer Institute to
affect tobacco use among heavy smokers (COMMIT, 1995).
Eleven pairs of matched cities were organized, and one of
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each pair received an intervention, which
included public education, work through
health care providers and work sites, and
provision of cessation resources, among
other activities. The interventions lasted
for four years and cost about $900,000 per
city. At the end of the four years about
18% of the heavy smokers in the control
cities had quit, and about 18% of the
heavy smokers in the intervention cities
had quit.
The Minnesota Heart Health Program
was a six-year intervention, sponsored by
the National Heart Lung and Blood Institute (NHLBI), to try and reduce heartrisky behavior. It was a follow-on to the
original Stanford Three Community Study
and was mounted simultaneously with the
Stanford Five Community Study and the
Pawtucket Heart Health program. It
worked in three experimental communities, keeping three other communities
as control cities. The interventions included retraining health professionals, systematic risk factor screening, mass media
outreach and organized classes, as well as
other activities. At the end of the six-year
intervention, the control cities showed a
7% decline in coronary heart disease risk,
and the treatment cities showed a 4%
decline; there was no statistically interpretable difference between them
(Luepker et al., 1994).
A third example is the Philadelphia
Anti-Domestic Violence program, a
15-month campaign in Philadelphia, PA
intending to affect social norms around
domestic violence and encourage people
to talk with others, including those at
risk, about such violence. The intervention included public relations efforts to
stimulate media coverage, some public
service and some paid advertising, and
work site and grassroots organizing. At
the start of the program, about threequarters of all adult Philadelphia respondents said they would talk with a woman

who they thought was being abused; at
the end of the program that proportion
was unchanged (Hornik, Wray, Stryker, &
Appleyard, 2002).
These three programs did not achieve
their major goals, although the first two
had some successes (COMMIT in increasing
moderate smokers’ quit rates and the
Minnesota program in reducing women’s
smoking rates). Their problematic results
are similar to those achieved by other
important trials of the same period. The
question is why were they unsuccessful in
affecting their primary outcomes? Was it
that they chose behaviors that were simply not susceptible to change? Clearly this
was not the issue: Heart-risky behaviors
and smoking rates, specifically, were
widely changing during the same periods
that these programs were operating and
failing to change these behaviors (see
Hornik, 2002b, for many examples).
Just previous to the Philadelphia
campaign, there was also a clearly
increasing rejection of domestic violence.
Were these programs unsuccessful because
they were ‘‘only’’ communication programs
and did not bring the other elements of
social marketing to their operations? Or
did they choose the wrong messages for
their communication efforts, leaving their
target audiences unconvinced? There is no
way to be sure that the incorporation of
some other program element or some different focus to the messages might not
have produced a better outcome. However, in each case the programs were
developed and implemented by serious
people with a good understanding of
relevant issues. If they did it wrong, it was
not likely to be because they did not
understand the logic of social marketing
or the need for developing appropriate
messages. Instead, it appears that a
stronger explanation lies in their inability
to achieve a high level of exposure for
their messages.
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The COMMIT trial used five channels:
distributing smoking cessation kits;
working through health care sites, work
sites, and religious organizations; and
making some use of mass media. Based on
a population survey in which people were
asked to recall their contact with each
activity, a rough index sums the level of
exposure to all channels on a 0-45 point
scale. The 11 intervention cities scored a
mean of 15.2 and the control cities scored
a mean of 14.9, a trivial difference. The
Minnesota program reported exposure to
its messages on a 0-10 point scale; across
the six years of the trial, the intervention
cities scored a mean of 2.5 and the control
cities a mean of 1.9. The difference was
small (although statistically significant).
In the Philadelphia program almost 80%
of the respondents recalled seeing an
antidomestic violence television ad in the
past year before the launch of the campaign; this percentage actually declined
during much of the period of the campaign.
In each of these three cases, the
interventions were unsuccessful in
achieving their primary goals, but they
were also unsuccessful in achieving substantial increases in recalled exposure to
their messages among the population. It
is perhaps no surprise: If a program is
unable to achieve much additional exposure to its messages, it is quite unlikely to
achieve its outcomes.

SOME OPTIMISTIC RESULTS
However, it is not enough to show that
programs with low exposure did not produce good outcomes. It is important to
establish that the opposite side of the
equation is true as well: Programs that have
achieved high exposure have produced
worthwhile outcomes. There are important
examples of programs that achieved high
levels of exposure to their interventions
and important behavioral outcomes as well.
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Six examples of such programs include the
Kentucky Drug Intervention, the Swiss
AIDS Campaign, the California Tobacco
Campaign, the Healthcom interventions,
the nonexperimental results from the
COMMIT trial, and the National High Blood
Pressure Education Program.
The Kentucky program was a twocounty trial of anti-marijuana paid advertising; enough advertising time was purchased to reach 70% of the targeted teen
audience three times per week. In fact,
85% of the intended audience recalled
exposure to the ads during intervention
periods. Each of the campaigns was associated with a sharp decline in past 30-day
use of marijuana among high sensationseeking youth (Palmgreen, Donohew,
Lorch, Hoyle, & Stephenson, 2002).
The Swiss ‘‘Stop AIDS’’ campaign was a
broad national campaign with explicit
messages on television, radio, newspapers
and outdoor advertising encouraging
condom use. It was carried out amidst
heavy coverage of the epidemic by Swiss
mass media, so it is difficult to separate
the effects of the deliberate campaign
from natural media coverage. Nonetheless, the level of behavior change was
striking: In 1987 less than 10% of 17- to
30-year-olds reported ‘‘always’’ using
condoms when they had casual sex; by
1988 this had increased to more than 40%
and continued to increase to close to 60%
by the early 1990s (Dubois-Arber,
Jeannin, Konings, & Paccaud, 1997).
The California antitobacco campaign
included several elements: increased
taxes, encouraging the development of
local antismoking ordinances, as well as a
substantial mass media campaign, costing
about $15 million per year between 19891993. During this period, California was
declining more rapidly than the rest of the
U.S. in its smoking prevalence (Pierce,
Emery, & Gilpin, 2002). There is some
evidence to suggest that the mass media
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component played a substantial role in
this decline (Hu, Sung, & Keeler, 1995).
The Healthcom interventions were a
set of programs sponsored by the U.S.
Agency for International Development in
developing countries to affect child survival-related behaviors such as immunization, appropriate treatment of diarrheal
disease, and breastfeeding. There were 16
evaluations of such programs in 10 countries. Seven programs achieved only a low
level of mass media exposure; only two of
them were successful, and both achieved a
high level of personal outreach by health
workers. The remaining nine programs
achieved high levels of exposure to mass
mediated messages; of those nine, seven
were successful. While this is a crude
analysis, it supports the arguments that
exposure is crucial to success (Hornik
et al., 2002).
The COMMIT trial was described above
as unsuccessful in increasing quit rates
among its target audience of heavy smokers, and it achieved only a low level of
exposure. However, it also provides an
example of the importance of high exposure. In a post hoc nonexperimental
analysis, the COMMIT research team compared the level of exposure achieved in a
city to the level of quit rates among
moderate smokers. In those cases when an
intervention city achieved a higher level
of exposure than its matched control city,
its quit rate was also noticeably higher.
The rank correlation between level of
exposure and level of quit rate was .71.
Finally, the National High Blood
Pressure Education Program was a kitchen
sink effort started in 1972 by the NHLBI
to transform the treatment of high blood
pressure in the U.S. It involved professional education, mass mediated interventions, community organizational work,
and many other activities, undertaken
over a long period and on a large scale.
The program was associated with a sharp

change in awareness of the risks of high
blood pressure, in the proportion of
hypertensives under medical control, and
with a large decline in stroke mortality
rates. In the 12-year period before 1972,
the stroke rate was declining for all U.S.
Whites at 1.6% per year; in the 1972-1984
period the decline was nearly 6% per year.
While other changes (in treatments or in
available medications, for example)
occurred during the same period, they
were probably not sufficient to account for
the observed declines (Roccella, 2002).
In each of these examples and others
(Hornik, 2002b), a high level of exposure
was associated with substantial behavioral
outcomes. Although the evaluations do
not use randomized trials and they cannot
eliminate all other explanations for the
observed results, they do make good cases
for the attribution of effects to the programs. They suggest that exposure is a
necessary element to achieving program
success; however, they do not guarantee
that exposure is sufficient to achieve such
success.

HOW DOES EXPOSURE WORK?
There are at least five mechanisms
that suggest an important role for exposure. The obvious mechanism is simple
learning. The more times a message is
made available, the more times an individual will be exposed to it and the more
likely he or she is to learn it. Or, in a
slightly more elaborate form, if people
vary over time in their readiness to attend
to a message, the more times it is made
available, the more likely they are to
hear=see it when they are ready to attend
to it. However, simple learning may not be
the only way that exposure matters. A
second path of effect may be ‘‘priming.’’
Priming occurs when repeated exposure to a message affects the weight given
to the message in deciding to engage in a
behavior. Thus a campaign may provide
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repeated messages about the effects of
smoking on athletic stamina. The first
hearing may be enough to convince
someone that there are deleterious
effects, but multiple hearings may prime
that belief so it is more likely to affect a
decision about whether to continue
smoking (Cappella, Fishbein, Hornik,
Ahern, & Sayeed, 2001).
High levels of exposure to messages,
particularly if they come from a variety
of channels, may affect behavior in a
third way, also. They may communicate
an implicit social expectation about a
behavior. If many channels are transmitting a message often, the meta-message
may be that society expects a particular
behavior. If an individual is vulnerable
to social norm pressure, such repeated
exposure may communicate a new
social norm.
A fourth path of effect for high
exposure may be in its ability to affect
social discussion about an issue and thus
the diffusion of the messages. If the
message is coming from many sources,
and is heard often, it is more likely to be
the subject of discussion. Those discussions may pass the message on, reinforce
the message, or lead to social network
rejection of the message.
The final path of effect may not
involve direct audience influence at all. If
a message gets high exposure it is more
likely to be heard by policymakers. If
policy attention reflects what is in the
public arena, high levels of exposure may
signal to policymakers that the issue has
captured public attention. Issues of public
concern, in turn, are the subjects of legislation, regulation, and funding for
interventions and of funding for research.
These, in turn, may affect the audiences’
behavior.
Whatever the path of effect, the
implication of these arguments is clear:
Get exposure, get exposure through
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multiple channels, and get exposure
repeatedly over time. That recommendation is easy enough to make; the question
is how it can be done in practice.

HOW TO GET EXPOSURE (PER
CAPITA)
The obvious path to exposure is
money: If a program wants exposure for
its messages, it needs to buy advertising
time. This is what a few large programs
have been able to do in the past few years,
notably the National Youth Anti-Drug
Media Campaign and the American Legacy
Foundation’s truth campaign (as well as
some state-level antitobacco campaigns).
However, if buying time is beyond the
available resources of a program, what can
it do?
It can beg for exposure. It can ask for
donated time from media outlets. The Ad
Council has taken some responsibility to
act as an intermediary between nonprofits
and the media, and there has been intermittent success with some campaigns.
Still, the total amount of such donated
time is small and divided among many
claimants. In a recent report, the Kaiser
Foundation made it clear how small the
opportunity is, noting that the total
donated TV time available was about 15
seconds per hour with most donated time
in overnight hours (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2002). This path is most likely to
be successful when the message is novel
and focused, when it can be made
appealing to local stations, when a little
exposure is enough, and when grassroots
lobbying support can be mobilized to stimulate local replay of messages.
A third path of effect would be to
‘‘earn’’ the coverage. There are two versions of this. Public relations professionals work hard to be able to gain media
attention for their concerns. Most
sophisticated social marketing programs
take a similar path, encouraging the

SMQ / VOL. VIII / NO. 3 / FALL 2002

36

INVITED PAPER

broadcast and print press, entertainment
programs, and other outlets to attend to
their message. They hope that they can
earn enough coverage through these
efforts, while retaining control over the
message content, to achieve enhanced
exposure to their messages. A second
version of ‘‘earned’’ exposure focuses not
on direct audience effects but on effects
on policymakers. In their book Media
Advocacy (1993), Wallack, Dorfman, Jernigan, and Themba focus on the problem
of convincing policymakers to endorse
regulations or legislation favoring a particular viewpoint. They present a range of
strategies for producing favorable press
coverage so as to put pressure on policymakers.
Finally, what does a program do when
it becomes clear that it has no good path
for achieving the needed level of exposure? In that case there are three possible
responses: The program needs to develop
a ‘‘getting exposure’’ strategy, that is, a
way of marketing its messages; the program needs to choose another objective,
one that can be achieved with only a low
level of exposure; or, finally, a program
can redefine its target population to a
narrow one for which it is able to achieve
a needed level of exposure.

CONCLUSION
There has been a great deal of attention in the social marketing and health
communication literature to the importance of messages and the need for them
to be responsive to their audiences. There
has been a good deal of attention to the
need for developing complementary components to support communication
efforts, to make sure that it is possible for
people to take recommended actions.
There is some recognition of the need for
segmentation of audiences, for the need to
understand the audience and what will

influence it to change, and for being
patient for changes that may occur only
slowly. These are all important elements in
constructing a public health social marketing program. However, none of them
matter if the program cannot devise a
strategy for getting exposure, through
multiple channels, over time.
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